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Alderwood Associates v. Washington
Environmental Council: State Action and The
Washington State Constitution
In Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental
Council,' the Washington Supreme Court reversed a temporary
restraining order forbidding the defendant's solicitation or dem-
onstration on plaintiff's privately owned shopping mall.
Although there was no majority opinion because the court split
four-one-four, the result of the several opinions is that the
Washington constitution now bars private as well as state
action2 that interferes with the gathering of initiative signatures
on certain private property. However, four justices also con-
cluded that the free speech sections of the Washington constitu-
tion restricts private as well as state action. The Alderwood
result is desirable, but could have been reached without an
abandonment of the state action requirement. Such an abandon-
ment, although subscribed to by less than a majority, strays
from principled constitutional analysis and inhibits further rea-
soned development of the state constitution.
Defendant, the Washington Environmental Council, spon-
sored Initiative 383, entitled The Radioactive Waste Storage and
Transportation Act of 1980.4 In order to have the initiative
placed on the November 1980 ballot, the defendant needed
123,700 registered voters' signatures.' To further its signature
1. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981).
2. The state action requirement arises out of the language of the first amendment.
In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Supreme Court held that the first
amendment applied to state as well as federal actions through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The United States Constitution states: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. 1. Thus, when a party invokes the guarantee of free speech he must show that he
is protesting actions by the government not those of private individuals. L. TRIBE, AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147 (1978). The Alderwood case is the first to address the
question of state action under the Washington constitution.
3. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5. "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right."
4. 96 Wash. 2d at 232, 635 P.2d at 110.
5. Id.
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drive, the council sought permission to solicit on the Alderwood
Mall. The Alderwood Associates, owner and operator of the
mall,' denied the council's request to solicit signatures on the
premises. Nevertheless, the council entered the mall and solic-
ited passersby in a "nonobstructive manner."'7 The Alderwood
Associates obtained a temporary order restraining the petition-
ers from entering the mall.8
In deciding that the Washington constitution protected the
exercise of free speech and the exercise of the initiative process
on a privately owned shopping center, Justice Utter, joined by
Justices Rosellini, Williams and Dore, acknowledged that, in
contrast to the state constitution, the first amendment to the
federal Constitution does not protect individuals seeking to
exercise their right to free speech on privately owned shopping
centers. Rather, federal first amendment rights are limited by
the concept of state action.' However, the four justices reasoned
that the United States Supreme Court's recent decision,
Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins 0 left state courts free to
interpret the state constitution independently of and more
expansively than the federal constitution as long as such an
interpretation would not deprive state citizens of federally guar-
anteed rights.
With this foundation laid, the Utter opinion examined arti-
cle 1, section 5 of the Washington constitution and found three
reasons why the state constitution did not require state action.
First, the justices reasoned that a literal interpretation of the
provision would not require limiting its protections to govern-
mental action." Second, they found that the free speech provi-
sions of the California"2 and New Jersey" constitutions were
6. Id. The Utter opinion stated that the mall was a "regional shopping center" and
noted that impact statements estimated that in 1978, 22,000 automobiles would enter the
110 acre mall on an average day.
7. Id. at 233, 635 P.2d at 110. The court noted that no one alleged the signature
gatherers were being annoying, or harassing or interfering with business activity on the
mall.
8. Id. at 232, 635 P.2d at 110.
9. Id. at 234-35, 635 P.2d at 111.
10. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
11. 96 Wash. 2d at 240, 635 P.2d at 114.
12. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a). "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his
or her sentiments on all subjects being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may
not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."
13. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 6. "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be
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similar to article 1, section 5 of the Washington constitution.
Thus, article 1, section 5 could be interpreted as Robins v.
PruneYard1 4 and State v. Schmid"5 had interpreted the free
speech provisions of the California and New Jersey constitu-
tions.16 Finally, the Utter opinion stated that the state action
doctrine, under the United States Constitution, involves balanc-
ing the right to free speech and the right to control private prop-
erty. At the federal level this balancing process is restrained by a
"conservative theoretical approach" not present at the state
court level.1 7
Although concluding that article 1, section 5 restricts pri-
vate as well as state interference with expression, the Utter
opinion nonetheless places limitations on the exercise of speech
and initiative rights on private property." The justices used a
balancing test to define the limits of the article 1, section 5
rights of the signature gatherers and the property rights of the
Alderwood Associates. 9 On the free speech side of the balance,
the factors included the extent to which the property is the
functional equivalent of a public forum,20 the nature of the
speech activity,21 the possibility of reasonable regulation by the
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."
14. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979). This opinion is the
California Supreme Court decision preceding the Supreme Court determination in
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). This article will refer to the
California decision as Robins and the United States Supreme Court decision as
Prune Yard.
15. 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed, 50 U.S.L.W. 4159 (U.S. Jan.
12, 1982).
16. 96 Wash. 2d at 240-41, 635 P.2d at 114-15.
17. Id. at 242, 635 P.2d at 115. The Utter opinion explained that this conservative
theoretical approach was necessary at the federal level because the Supreme Court must
fashion a rule governing the state action issue for the entire country, and because "feder-
alism prevents the court [sic] from adopting a rule which prevents states from
experimenting."
18. Id. at 243, 635 P.2d at 116.
19. Id. at 244, 635 P.2d at 116.
20. The justices stated,
As property becomes the functional equivalent of a downtown area or other
public forum, reasonable speech activities become less of an intrusion on the
owner's autonomy interests. When property is open to the public, the owner
has a reduced expectation of privacy and, as a corollary, any speech activity is
less threatening to the property's value.
Id.
21. "The exercise of free speech is given great weight in the balance, because it is a
preferred right. And where the exercise of the speech also involves the initiative process,
the activity takes on added constitutional significance." Id. at 244-45, 635 P.2d 116.
334 University of Puget Sound Law Review
time, place, and manner of speech,2 2 and the involvement of
other constitutional rights.2 3 On the other side, the justices bal-
anced the due process rights of the property owner and the pos-
sibility that the exercise of speech on the property amounted to
a taking of property without compensation.2" Under the Alder-
wood facts, the four justices concluded that the balance favored
the exercise of free speech and initiative rights and that such
activities did not infringe on the rights of the property owners.
Justice Dolliver concurred in the result but not in the ratio-
nale of the Utter opinion. He found no state precedent for using
article 1, section 5 "as a sword by individuals against individu-
als." Rather, the provision was designed "as a shield against the
actions of the state. '25 Acknowledging that in the past the
Washington Supreme Court had construed similar federal and
state constitutional provisions differently, he stated that article
1, section 5 had not been subject to independent scrutiny con-
cerning state action.2 6 He perceived the Utter opinion's rationale
as an unwarranted expansion of the state constitution, more
properly achieved through legislation than judicial interpre-
tation.17
Nevertheless, Justice Dolliver found the presence of the sig-
nature gatherers on the mall permissible under the initiative
provision of the Washington constitution.2 This provision gives
Washington State citizens the right to initiate legislative action
through a petition process.2 9 Relying on the police power of the
state, Justice Dolliver reasoned that the state could reasonably
promote the availability of the initiative process to all citizens
by allowing signature gatherers to enter the private property.30
22. Id. at 245, 635 P.2d at 116.
23. Id. at 246, 635 P.2d at 117.
24. Id. at 245-46, 635 P.2d at 117. The justices also considered the issues of moot-
ness, scope of review and attorney's fees. On the issue of mootness, the justices held "the
question presented by this case is one which is likely to recur and, given its importance,
an authoritative determination is needed." Id. at 233, 635 P.2d at 110-11. The scope of
review was limited to the question of whether there was a clear legal right to the tempo-
rary restraining order. Id. at 233-34, 635 P.2d at 111. Finally, the majority remanded the
case to the trial court for a determination on attorney's fees. Id. at 247, 635 P.2d at 117-
18.
25. Id. at 250, 635 P.2d at 119 (Dolliver, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 248-49, 635 P.2d at 118.
27. Id. at 250, 635 P.2d at 119.
28. Id. at 251, 635 P.2d at 120.
29. This section provides in part: "Initiative. The first power reserved by the people
is the initiative." WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 1(a) (amend. 7).
30. 96 Wash. 2d at 252-53, 635 P.2d at 120-21.
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He distinguished the initiative process from other forms of peti-
tioning, noting that under article 2, section 1(a), the petitioners
are "part of the apparatus of government-the legislative
branch." 1
The remaining four justices dissented, in an opinion Justice
Stafford authored, disagreeing with both the Dolliver and Utter
opinions. Acknowledging that the police power would allow the
state legislature to subordinate the Associates' property rights to
the council's speech rights, the dissenting justices found no such
legislative intent in the initiative clause itself." Furthermore,
the justices stated that the abrogation of the state action
requirement removed reasonable limitations on the exercise of
free speech and inappropriately deviated from the reasoned
principles of federal constitutional law.,"
As Justice Utter recognized, 4 state courts may interpret
their constitutions without regard to the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the federal Constitution, providing that the states
do not deny their citizens liberties that the federal Constitution
guarantees.3' Despite this freedom of construction, state courts
have often relied upon federal precedent for interpretation of
state constitutional provisions with federal counterparts. 6 The
public function analysis is a method of establishing state action
that states have borrowed from federal case law and used to
interpret their own constitutions, thereby incorporating the
analysis into their own body of precedent.
Under the public function doctrine, private parties perform-
31. Id. at 253, 635 P.2d at 121.
32. If the State had in any manner imposed such a restriction I would reverse
the trial court, but no such limitation has ever been enacted. Nevertheless, the
concurrence would, without either analysis or construction of [Art. 2, § 1(a)
(amend. 7)], establish a new restriction on property rights. The resulting
restriction then would be carved into constitutional granite.
Id. at 254, 635 P.2d at 121.
33. Id.
34. 96 Wash. 2d at 237, 635 P.2d at 112.
35. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968); Cooper v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966).
36. See In re George F. Nord Bldg. Corp., 129 F.2d 173 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 670 (1942); Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 474 F.
Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 638 F.2d 404 (1980); KPOJ, Inc. v.
Thornton, 253 Or. 512, 456 P.2d 76 (1969). See also Brennan, State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 H~Av. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977); Howard, State
Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REy. 873,
878 (1976).
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ing "inherently governmental"37 activities must adhere to consti-
tutional restrictions otherwise applicable only to the govern-
ment.38 The Supreme Court began its development of the public
function doctrine in Marsh v. Alabama.39 In Marsh, the deputy
sheriff of a company town" arrested a Jehovah's Witness for
trespassing41 when she refused to stop distributing religious
literature on the town's sidewalks.' The Court reasoned that
"the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for
use by the public in general, the more do his rights become cir-
cumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those
who use it."' Then, the Court balanced the constitutional rights
of property owners against the preferred rights of freedom of
press and religion," and reversed appellant's conviction. 5
Stressing that the privately owned town functioned indistin-
guishably from a public municipality, 4 the Court held that citi-
zens of a privately owned town are no less entitled to the free-
doms of press and religion than are citizens of a public
municipality.47
37. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 18-5 (1978).
38. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 456
(1978).
39. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Additional cases dealing with reconciliation of free speech
and private property claims include Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, reh'g denied, 445 U.S.
972 (1980); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180
(1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S.
539 (1972); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Taggart v.
Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970).
40. The Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned the property on which the town of
Chickasaw was situated. The Court compared Chickasaw to other American towns, stat-
ing that it was composed of "residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage
disposal plant and a 'business block' on which business places are situated." 326 U.S. at
502.
41. Title 14, Section 426 of the 1940 Alabama Code made it a crime to enter or
remain on another's premises after having been warned not to do so. Id. at 503-04. The
corporation posted notices in the stores in the business district prohibiting solicitation
without permission. Further, appellant had been warned that she could not distribute
her literature without a permit and that she would not be granted one. Id. at 503.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 506, citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802 n.8 (1945).
44. 326 U.S. at 509.
45. Id. at 510.
46. Id. at 502, 503, 505, 508.
47. Id. at 508-09. Justice Black began the Court's analysis by stating that if Chicka-
saw had been a public municipality, appellant's conviction would clearly have required
reversal. Id. at 504.
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In Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,s
the Court extended the public function analysis to a privately
owned shopping center. Logan Valley upheld union picketing of
a nonunion market located within a shopping center complex. 9
The Court conceded that the power to exclude was a right tradi-
tionally associated with private property ownership, 0 but held
that because the shopping center was the functional equivalent
of the business district in Marsh,5 1 "the State may not delegate
the power, through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude
those members of the public wishing to exercise their First
Amendment rights on the premises in a manner and for a pur-
pose generally consonant with the purpose to which the property
is actually put."5
Four years later, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,5" the Supreme
Court severely limited the precedential value of Logan Valley."
Respondents sought relief after employees of a privately owned
shopping center requested that they cease distributing anti-war
handbills inside the Center."5 The Court held for the shopping
center,"e distinguishing Logan Valley on two grounds. First,
48. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
49. Id. at 309. Shortly after opening, Weis, the owner of the market, posted a sign
prohibiting trespassing or soliciting by anyone except the market's employees on its
porch or parking lot. Nine days later, nonemployee union members began peacefully
picketing Weis because it was nonunion. The picketing took place almost entirely in the
parcel pickup area and the immediately adjacent portion of the parking lot, and did not
congest the parcel pickup area. Id. at 311-12.
50. Id. at 319.
51. Id. at 318. Unlike the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation in Marsh, the Logan Valley
Plaza did not own the surrounding residential property. However, the Court did not find
this fact determinative. Id. The Court found the determinative fact in Marsh to have
been private property functioning as a public business district. Id. Therefore, the Court
did not distinguish the business district in a company town surrounded by company
owned property of Marsh from private property functioning as a business district of
Logan Valley. Id. at 319.
52. Id. at 319-20. However, the Court held the exercise of first amendment rights on
private property to be subject to reasonable restrictions. Permissible restrictions include
those preventing interference with the use to which the property is ordinarily put. Id. at
320.
53. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
54. In Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519 (1976), the Court stated that "the ulti-
mate holding in Lloyd amounted to a total rejection of the holding in Logan Valley."
55. Lloyd's security guards told the handbillers that they were trespassing and
would be arrested unless they stopped distribution. 407 U.S. at 557. Since commencing
operations, the Center, a large privately owned shopping complex, had strictly enforced
its policy against handbilling. Id. at 556.
56. Id. at 571. As noted in 30 DRAKE L. Rv. 422, 427 n.60 (1980), the Lloyd decision
may be partially attributed to a change in the Court's composition. Between Logan Val-
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unlike the picketing in Logan Valley, the handbilling in Lloyd
bore no relation to the Center's purpose.5 7 In addition, the pick-
eters in Logan Valley were denied all reasonable opportunity to
convey their message to the public; the handbillers in Lloyd
were not.5s Although the Court did not indicate the weight to
which an owner's property rights are entitled, it held that "[ilt
would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to
require them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights
under circumstances where adequate alternative means of com-
munication exist."60 Such an accommodation would diminish the
property owner's rights without enhancing the speaker's first
amendment rights. 1
Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins62 is the Court's most
ley in 1968 and Lloyd in 1972, Justices Burger, Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist
replaced Justices Warren, Fortes, Black, and Harlan. In Lloyd, the four new justices
joined Justice White, who had dissented in Logan Valley, and formed a new majority.
57. 407 U.S. at 565. The Court posited that the handbillers' message was not
directed toward Lloyd Center patrons exclusively, but to the general public. The
handbillers could have distributed their information on any public street or.sidewalk or
in any park or building in the city. Furthermore, Lloyd's invitation to the public was
limited to an invitation to do business with the merchants in the complex. Id. at 565-66.
58. Id. at 566-67. See supra note 57.
59. The Court stated that the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments as well as the taking clause of the fifth amendment were relevant. 407 U.S.
at 567.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 568. The Court noted that although the fundamental rights provided by
the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments are not necessarily incompatible, there may
be situations in which their accommodation is not easy. Id. at 570. However, in this case
the Court easily made the required accommodation. Id. at 571.
62. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). PruneYard has received extensive comment: Cohen,
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins: Past Present and Future, 57 CHI.-KENr L. REv.
373 (1981); Note, State Constitutions and Freedom of Speech on Private Property, 18
AM. Bus. L.J. 562 (1981); Recent Development, Freedom of Speech v. Right to Privacy, 5
AM. J. TIAL Anvoc. 717 (1981); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HAav. L. REv. 169
(1980); Comment, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 289 (1980);
30 DRAKE L. REV. 422 (1980-81); 32 MERCER L. REV. 637 (1981); XXXII U. FLA. L. REv.
760 (1980); 13 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 171 (1981); 20 WASHBURN L. J. 453 (1981).
Recently, commentators have urged state courts to focus their attention on state
constitutions when contemplating questions concerning personal liberties. Brennan,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HAiv. L. REv. 489
(1977); Countryman, The Role of a Bill of Rights in a Modern State Constitution: Why
a State Bill of Rights? 45 WASH. L. REV. 453 (1970); Howard, State Courts and Constitu-
tional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976). Foreseeing an
end to an era of activism, Justice Brennan has suggested that state courts should be the
new guardians of individual liberties. Brennan, supra at 491. Another commentator has
suggested the following factors for state courts to consider when evaluating state consti-
tutional questions independently of the federal constitution: the textual language of the
provision, the history and tradition of the state, the nature of the subject matter and the
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recent decision addressing the conflict between a property
owner's constitutional rights and a citizen's free speech rights in
the context of a privately owned shopping center. The Court
held that states may interpret their constitutions broadly's to
allow their citizens to exercise free speech in a shopping center
without violating the property owner's fifth, first, and fourteenth
amendment rights." In Prune Yard, a group of students sought
to enjoin a privately owned shopping center from refusing to
allow them to distribute handbills and solicit petition signatures
inside the mall.6 5 The California Supreme Court decided that
the California constitution protected reasonably exercised
speech and petitioning in a privately owned shopping center."
The United States Supreme Court affirmed,67 acknowledg-
ing that a state may impose reasonable restrictions on private
property in exercise of its police power if the restrictions do not
amount to a taking without just compensation or contravene any
other federal constitutional provision." Because the students'
activity did not impair the property's use as a shopping center,
permitting the students to exercise their state protected free
expression and petitioning rights in the center did not violate
the owner's fifth amendment property rights. In addition, the
interests affected by the local political process, the extent to which the Supreme Court
has shown a "hands-off" attitude toward the subject matter, the ease of amending the
state constitution, the extraterritorial effect of any decision, the effect of "constitutional-
izing" any area of the law, whether the court is legislating and finally, whether the court
is establishing unascertainable standards. Howard, supra at 934-44.
63. The Court noted that Lloyd had not limited a state's authority to adopt more
expansive personal liberties in its own constitution than those provided by the federal
Constitution. 447 U.S. at 81, citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). The
court distinguished Lloyd as not involving construction of a state constitutional or statu-
tory provision. 447 U.S. at 81.
64. 447 U.S. at 88.
65. Id. at 77. In a peaceful and orderly fashion, the students solicited signatures for
their petition opposing a United Nations resolution against "Zionism." The PruneYard
had strictly and nondiscriminatorily enforced its policy against public expressive activity
unrelated to its commercial purposes. Id.
66. Id. at 78, citing 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860
(1979).
67. 447 U.S. at 88.
68. Id. at 81.
69. Id. at 83. The Court held that it would recognize as a taking only a regulation
which went "too far." Id. The Court admitted that a "taking" had occurred to the extent
that California allowed its citizens to exercise free speech and petition rights on privately
owned property, but advised that not every injury to property is a "taking" in the consti-
tutional sense. Id. at 82, citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960). The
Court held that the test for whether state action violates the taking clause of the fifth
amendment requires an inquiry into "the character of the governmental action, its eco-
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property owner failed to establish a denial of due process10 or a
violation of his first amendment right not to be forced to use his
property as a forum for the speech of another. 1
A Washington court relied on the federal courts' public
function doctrine as a method of establishing state action in the
shopping center context in Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping
Center, Inc.7 2 In Sutherland, the court of appeals addressed the
issue "whether an unconsented invasion of the property rights of
owners of land to solicit signatures for an initiative is protected
by the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution and by article 1, sections 4, 5, and 9 of the Wash-
nomic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations." 447
U.S. at 82-83, citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
Not only are Washington property owners' rights protected by the federal Constitu-
tion, they are also protected by the Washington constitution. Article 1, § 3 states: "[N]o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Article
1, § 16 states in part: "[Nbo private property shall be taken or damaged for public or
private use without just compensation having first been made .... Whenever an
attempt is made to take private property for use alleged to be public, the question
whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and deter-
mined as such, without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public. ... 
The Alderwood court did not address the issue of whether the Washington constitutional
protections of property rights are different from the federal protections under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments as defined in PruneYard and Lloyd. The state constitu-
tional language is substantially similar to that of the federal provisions, and case law
indicates the state has deferred to federal interpretations of the fourteenth amendment
when interpreting article 1, section 3. In Petstel, Inc. v. County of King, 77 Wash. 2d
144, 153, 459 P.2d 937, 942 (1969), the court stated:
We note that our constitutional provision, 'No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law', is the same as that in the
federal constitution; and that the federal cases while not necessarily controlling
should be given 'great weight' in construing our own due process provision.
See also Herr v. Schwager, 145 Wash. 101, 258 P. 1039 (1927); Bowman v. Waldt, 9
Wash. App. 562, 513 P.2d 559 (1973).
70. 447 U.S. at 85. The Court noted that due process required "only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have
a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." Id., citing Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502. 525 (1934).
71. 447 U.S. at 85-87. The Court distinguished Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1977), upon which the property owner relied for the proposition that a state may not
require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by
displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that the
public observe it. Id. Because the PruneYard was not limited to the owner's personal
use, the public was not likely to interpret the views of those who exercised their free
speech rights on the premises as those of its owner. Additionally, the state of California
did not dictate that a specific message be displayed on the owner's property. Finally, the
Court asserted that PruneYard's owner could expressly disavow any message by posting
signs near the person exercising his free speech rights. Id.
72. 3 Wash. App. 833, 478 P.2d 792 (1970).
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ington State Constitution. 7' The court reasoned that the pri-
vately owned shopping center met the constitutional state action
requirement by using deputized security personnel and by
invoking the state's authority to establish an action for criminal
trespass."" Because the court decided Sutherland on the basis of
Logan Valley, it is not surprising that the court upheld petition-
ers' right to solicit signatures in the privately owned shopping
center.7" The importance of Sutherland to Alderwood, however,
lies in the two fundamental assumptions the Sutherland court
made in rendering its decision.
First, the Sutherland court implicitly assumed that article
1, section 5 of the Washington constitution and the first amend-
ment of the United States Constitution provided identical pro-
tections to state citizens." Second, the court applied a state
action analysis in order to determine whether the shopping
center's activities implicated state and federal protections. It
analyzed the state action requirement through the public func-
tion doctrine, implying that by using deputized security person-
nel and by relying on the state's authority to establish an action
for criminal trespass, the shopping center was engaging in inher-
ently governmental activities and must therefore adhere to con-
stitutional restrictions.7 In conjunction, these two assumptions
demonstrate that when the court of appeals decided Sutherland,
it interpreted article 1, section 5 of the state constitution as
being identical to the first amendment, thereby incorporating
federal precedent concerning the first amendment into Washing-
ton's construction of article 1, section 5. In addition, the Suther-
land court considered article 1, section 5 as including a state
action requirement that could be met through a public function
analysis. Washington courts did not consider the question again
until Alderwood.
Justice Utter's Alderwood opinion not only failed to account
adequately for Sutherland's reliance on federal precedent in the
73. Id. at 835, 478 P.2d at 793.
74. Id. at 836, 478 P.2d at 794.
75. Id. at 848, 478 P.2d at 800.
76. Even though the court stated the issue as "whether an unconsented invasion of
the property rights of owners of land to solicit signatures for an initiative is protected by
the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and by article 1,
sections 4, 5, and 9 of the Washington State Constitution," Id. at 835, 478 P.2d at 793,
the court analyzed the issue exclusively on the basis of Supreme Court construction of
the first amendment.
77. Id. at 836, 478 P.2d at 794.
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public function arena,78 but it also failed to account for Wash-
ington courts' interpretation of article 1, section 5 in cases not
involving shopping centers. Although, unlike its federal counter-
part, the literal language of article 1, section 5 does not include a
state action requirement,7 9 Washington courts have historically
implied such a requirement into the section, consistently inter-
preting section 5 as the state's equivalent of the first amend-
ment.80 As recently as 1980, the Washington State Supreme
Court noted that "[tihe state equivalent of the First Amend-
ment is Const. art. 1, § 5 . . .,81
Although, as Justice Utter recognized in Alderwood, Wash-
ington courts are free to interpret article 1, section 5 of the
Washington constitution without regard to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the first amendment, 2 this power did not origi-
nate in PruneYard.8s Until Alderwood, Washington courts exer-
cised this choice by interpreting article 1, section 5 as being
identical to the federal first amendment." By disposing entirely
of the state action requirement in a constitutional provision
Washington courts have traditionally considered equivalent to
the first amendment, the justices inappropriately disregarded
Washington's constitutional precedent.
Furthermore, the Utter opinion maintained that California
has a constitutional provision similar to article 1, section 5."1 It
suggested that California's provision provided the model for
Washington's article 1, section 5, and implied that similar con-
struction of the sections is appropriate.8" Utter and those who
78. Justice Utter discounted the value of Sutherland because the court of appeals
decided it on the basis of Logan Valley, which Lloyd and Hudgens overruled. 96 Wash.
2d at 239, 635 P.2d at 113. He distinguished Sutherland on the ground that "this case is
representative of an area where the law has remained constant while society, in both its
expectations and behavior, has changed." 96 Wash. 2d at 239, 635 P.2d at 113-14.
79. Id. at 240, 635 P.2d at 114.
80. In Fine Arts Guild, Inc. v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 2d 503, 512, 445 P.2d 602, 607
(1968), the court stated: "We have, however, in varying contexts, applied the provisions
of Const. art. 1, § 5, and the first amendment to the United States in pari materia and
inferentially interchangeable." See also Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wash. 2d 460, 483, 335
P.2d 10, 23 (1959); infra text accompanying note 81.
81. Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 58, 615 P.2d 440, 444
(1980).
82. 96 Wash. 2d at 241, 635 P.2d at 113.
83. See supra note 35.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
85. 96 Wash. 2d at 240, 635 P.2d at 114.
86. Id. at 240-41, 635 P.2d at 114. "The California constitutional speech guarantee,
article 1, section 2, is substantially similar to section 5. In fact, section 5 was modeled
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joined in his opinion relied on Robins v. PruneYard Shopping
Center87 for the conclusion that the California Supreme Court
has held that its constitutional provision does not require state
action.
This interpretation of Robins may be misleading. The Cali-
fornia court did not employ a state action analysis in order to
reach the conclusion that the petitioners in Robins could enter
onto private property.8 The court overruled California prece-
dent prohibiting free speech activity on shopping center prop-
erty,89 reasoning that the state's common law could be used to
protect the petitioner's rights. The court stated that under
Hudgens v. NLRB,90 a state's statutory or common law may
extend an individual's freedom of speech rights even on private
property29 1 Reviewing California case law, the court concluded
that the state had a history of affording stronger free speech
after it." The California free speech provision was originally contained in the California
constitution at article 1, section 9. It was substantially the same as the current provision
stating, "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." The provision was amended in 1974.
87. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
88. Comment, Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center: Free Speech Access to Shop-
ping Centers Under the California Constitution, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 641, 656-58 (1980).
The author states that the California Supreme Court "has yet to announce any deviation
from the federal state action standard" and notes that the Robins court did not raise the
state action issues. Thus he concludes" . . . given the court's silence, it is more probable
that it was reserving judgment on the state action issue." But see, Comment, Robins v.
PruneYard Shopping Center: Federalism and State Protection of Free Speech, 10
GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 805, 806 (1980).
89. 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860. The court overruled
Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974) (Diamond II).
In Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970) (Diamond I),
the California Supreme Court held that, under Marsh and Logan Valley, plaintiffs could
solicit signatures for an anti-pollution initiative and distribute leaflets on a privately
owned shopping center. In Diamond II, decided after Lloyd, the court removed the per-
manent injunction restraining defendants from excluding the signature gatherers from
the shopping center property.
90. 424 U.S. 507 (1976). The Supreme Court stated:
It is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech
is a guarantee only against abridgement by government, federal or state ....
Thus, while statutory or common law may in some situations extend protection
or private redress against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge
the free expression of others, no such protection or redress is provided by the
Constitution itself.
Id. at 513.
91. 23 Cal. 3d at 905, 592 P.2d at 344, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 857. See Brief of Plaintiff at
34, Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635
P.2d 108 (1981).
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guarantees under its own constitution than those afforded under
the federal Constitution.2 Furthermore, despite the absence of
any specific state regulation, the court implied that its holding
was supported by the use of the state's police power to subject
private property to the rights of individuals.93
The Utter opinion advanced substantially the same argu-
ment in regard to the New Jersey constitution.9 4 Stating that the
New Jersey guarantee is similar to the Washington provision,"
Justice Utter argued that the New Jersey constitution does not
contain a state action requirement under the New Jersey
Supreme Court holding in State v. Schmid. 6 In Schmid, the
defendant entered the premises of Princeton University, and
distributed political materials.97 Under university regulations,
off-campus organizations needed university permission before
selling or distributing political materials on campus. Schmid did
not receive permission; consequently, he was arrested and con-
92. 23 Cal. 3d at 908, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
93. The court stated, "To protect free speech and petitioning is a goal that surely
matches the protecting of health and safety, the environment, aesthetics, property values
and other societal goals that have been held to justify reasonable restrictions on private
property rights." 23 Cal. 3d at 908, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal Rptr. at 859.
However, Justice Richardson, dissenting in Robins, objected to the court's use of the
police power to justify its holding. He stated, "The 'zoning for free speech uses' which
the majority attempts to accomplish today goes far beyond any traditional police power
regulation. Such unprecedented fiat has no support in constitutional, statutory or deci-
sional law." Id. at 916, 592 P.2d at 351, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
The justices also relied on Laguna Pub. Co. v. Golden West Pub. Corp., 110 Cal.
App. 3d 43, 167 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1980) to support their contention that article 2, section 1,
of the California constitution contains no state action requirement. In Laguna, the plain-
tiffs were denied permission to distribute free literature in a privately owned residential
community where defendant was allowed to make the same kind of distribution. Plain-
tiffs alleged their exclusion from the privately owned premises violated their right to free
speech under the California constitution article 2, section 1. The court held the private
residential community did not perform a public function as defined in Marsh. Therefore,
excluding plaintiff did not constitute state action. Instead, the court held that, under
PruneYard, the private community could exclude all newspaper distributors. However,
once they had voluntarily admitted the defendant to the premises, they could not
exclude other distributors falling within the same category from exercising the same
right.
94. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 6.
95. The Utter opinion states, "New Jersey also has a constitutional provision like
ours. The New Jersey Supreme Court has held, like the court in California, that its pro-
vision does not require 'state action'." 96 Wash. 2d at 241, 635 P.2d at 114-15.
96. 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed, 50 U.S.L.W. 4159 (U.S. Jan.
12, 1982).
97. 84 N.J. at 538-39, 423 A.2d at 616-17. The defendant was a member of the
United States Labor Party. The political materials concerned both the United States
Labor Party and the Newark mayoral campaign.
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victed of trespass. 8 In holding for Schmid, the New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the federal first
amendment protected Schmid's activities." The court decided,
however, that the state constitution article 1, section 6 provided
a basis for protection of free speech on a private university's
property. Bringing together several strands of analysis, the court
stated that freedom of speech had been given strong protection
under the New Jersey constitution, 100 and on occasion the state
guarantee of free speech had been asserted against private as
well as public entities. 10 1 This was not because the state consti-
tution lacked a state action requirement, but because the doc-
trine of state action had less force under state constitutions.'10
Furthermore, the court stressed the "mutuality" of the federal
first amendment and the New Jersey constitution's article 1, sec-
tion 6.103 Although no state regulation was involved in the facts
of the case, the court also discussed the ability of the state,
through its police power, to reasonably restrict the ability of
property owners to limit expressive activity on their property.'14
In resolving the conflict between the university's property rights
and Schmid's right to free speech in favor of Schmid, the court
98. Id. at 538-41, 423 A.2d at 617-18.
99. Rejecting Schmid's claim to federal protection, the court held the private uni-
versity was not an arm of the state government and did not perform a public function
under the Lloyd decision. Furthermore, the state constitution provided alternatives to
federal relief. Id. at 551-53, 423 A.2d at 619, 623-24.
100. Id. at 556-57, 423 A.2d at 626.
101. Finally, the rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the State Consti-
tution are protectable not only against governmental or public bodies, but
under some circumstances against private persons as well. It has been noted
that in our interpretation of fundamental State constitutional rights there are
no constraints arising out of principles of federalism.
Id. at 559-60, 423 A.2d at 628.
102. "Hence, federal requirements concerning 'state action,' founded primarily in
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment and on principles of federal-state relations,
do not have the same force when applied to state based constitutional rights." Id. Justice
Schreiber stated in his concurring opinion, however, that "[u]nlike its counterpart in the
Federal Constitution, the New Jersey constitutional guaranty of free speech is not cir-
cumscribed by the need to find state action." Id. at 580, 423 A.2d at 639.
103. [Tihere nonetheless exist meaningful parallels between the federal Consti-
tution and state constitutions, especially in the areas where constitutional val-
ues are shared, such as speech and assembly. Indicative of such mutuality, our
State Constitution not only affirmatively guarantees to individuals the rights of
speech and assembly, but also expressly prohibits government itself, in a man-
ner analogous to the federal First and Fourteenth Amendments, from unlaw-
fully restraining or abridging "the liberty of speech."
Id. at 560, 423 A.2d at 628.
104. Id. at 561-63, 423 A.2d at 629.
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used a test with three factors. The factors were: the nature of
the property and its primary use, the extent of public invitation
to use the property, and the purpose of the expressive activity.
10 5
Thus, rather than clearly determining that the New Jersey con-
stitutional provision did not contain a state action requirement,
the court appeared to expand the concept of state action to
include the university.
In addition to its reliance on the California and New Jersey
decisions, the Utter opinion maintains that the Washington
Supreme Court is not constrained by the "conservative theoreti-
cal approach" necessary at the federal court level. While this
may be true, it is not a sufficient rationale for abandoning a
state action requirement in the state constitution.'" Not only
does the state action requirement of the federal Constitution
limit the ability of individuals to assert their first amendment
rights against anyone except the government, or entities with
certain governmental attributes, it also protects the private
property owner's right to exclude those who wish to enter his
premises to pursue constitutionally protected speech activity.107
Justice Stafford recognized that abrogation of the state action
doctrine could leave the lower courts free to require private
home owners to allow signature gatherers to solicit passersby
from the home owner's front yard.1 08 Furthermore, without a
state action requirement, every conflict between private prop-
erty rights and free speech rights would be elevated to a consti-
tutional issue. As one commentator suggested, this could result
in greater judicial intervention in the regulation of property
rights.109
Instead of relying on the principled analysis of the state
action doctrine as a basis for limiting the exercise of free speech,
Justice Utter's opinion unnecessarily confused future interpreta-
tions of article 1, section 5 by imposing a balancing test to pro-
tect both the rights of the signature gatherers and the property
owner. 10 The opinion justified the balancing test by stating
105. Id. at 562-64, 423 A.2d at 630.
106. See, Project Report, Toward an Activist Role of State Bills of Rights, 8 HAV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 290 (1973).
107. L. TRIBE, AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1147 (1978).
108. 96 Wash. 2d at 254 n.10, 635 P.2d at 121 n.1.
109. Comment, Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center: Free Speech Access to
Shopping Centers Under the California Constitution, supra note 88, at 659.
110. 96 Wash. 2d 243-44, 635 P.2d at 116.
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that, freed from the restraints of federal interpretations of the
state action requirement, the Washington courts would be better
able to protect both speech and property interests.11 ' However,
the proposed balancing test reflects nearly the same considera-
tions as would a state action analysis. Most importantly, the test
would still examine the extent to which the private property
serves a public function.' 2
Rather than abandoning state action, the Washington
Supreme Court could have relied on Prune Yard and acknowl-
edged the utility of a state action requirement in the Washing-
ton constitution article 1, section 5. The court could have
defined the public function attributes necessary to establish
state action more liberally to include shopping malls."5' Recent
cases involving shopping centers have demonstrated that they
are an important public forum, providing superior access to the
large numbers of people who are attracted to the goods and ser-
vices offered for sale on their premises.1 4 The court could have
111. Id.
112. The Alderwood approach involves balancing several factors. "The first is the
use and nature of the private property. As property becomes the functional equivalent of
a downtown area or other public forum, reasonable speech activities become less of an
intrusion on the owner's autonomy interest." Id. at 244, 635 P.2d at 116. This approach
is very similar to the public function analysis outliined in the following cases: Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1969); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
113. This approach was suggested in Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for
State Bills of Rights, 8 HAzv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 271, 300-01.
A number of commentators have suggested that the public function doc-
trine ought to be expanded into a general proposition that as an enterprise
takes on the characteristics of government, it ought to become subject to the
obligations of government. More specifically, it has been proposed that large
business and social organizations ought to be regulated by the Bill of Rights
not just insofar as they open their real property to the public but in all their
quasi-governmental functions. . . . In sum, the regulation of large organiza-
tions could prove to be one of the most fertile areas for state bill of rights
development.
See also Countryman, The Role of a Bill of Rights in a Modern State Constitution: Why
a State Bill of Rights? 45 WASH. L. REv. 453, 473 (1970).
114. See, Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 310-
11 (1968); Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 902, 592 P.2d 341, 342,
153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 855 (1979); Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 655, 477 P.2d 733, 734,
91 Cal. Rptr. 501, 502 (1970) (Diamond I); Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 342, 521
P.2d 460, 468, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, 476 (1974) (Diamond II) (Mosk, J., dissenting); Suther-
land v. Southcenter Shopping Center, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 833, 835, 478 P.2d 792, 793
(1970); Brief of the Defendants at 27-31, Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environ-
mental Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1980); Brief Amicus Curiae at 4-5,
Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d
108 (1980).
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provided access to these forums and avoided jeopardizing prop-
erty rights in other factual contexts. By simply returning to a
public function analysis as found in Logan Valley, the same bal-
ance of constitutional rights could have been achieved.
The majority opinions in Schmid and Robins, and Justice
Dolliver's opinion in Alderwood, suggest that the state's police
power would allow the state legislature to subordinate the shop-
ping mall owner's property rights to the rights of the signature
gatherers. While the federal government is one of enumerated
powers and must find authority in the Constitution to support
its actions, the state government is one of retained powers.
Thus, under the state's police power, state regulations are pre-
sumptively valid unless forbidden by the state or federal consti-
tution. 115 In Washington, restrictions on constitutionally guaran-
teed rights are valid if the regulation bears a reasonable
relationship to the promotion of the health, peace, morals, edu-
cation, good order, or welfare of the citizens of the state. 1 A
regulation under the police power does not amount to a taking
of private property.1 1 7 In Lloyd, the Supreme Court indicated
that reasonable regulation of access to shopping centers was not
offensive to federally protected property rights.1 18 However,
115. U.S. Const. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." See also, Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of
Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 298 (1973).
116. State v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 94, 508 P.2d 149 (1973); Conger
v. Pierce Cty., 116 Wash. 27, 198 P. 377 (1921); State v. Gossett, 11 Wash. App. 864, 527
P.2d 91 (1974).
117. In Conger v. Pierce County the court stated,
It is easy to understand the principles upon which the police power doctrine is
based, but difficult to define in language its limitations. It is not inconsistent
with nor antagonistic to the rules of law concerning the taking of private prop-
erty for a public use. . . . It has been defined as an inherent power in the state
which permits it to prevent all things harmful to the comfort, welfare and
safety of society. It is based on necessity. It is exercised for the benefit of the
public health, peace and welfare. Regulating and restricting the use of private
property in the interest of the public is its chief business. It is the basis of the
idea that the private individual must suffer without other compensation than
the benefit to be received by the general public. . . . Eminent domain takes
private property for a public use, while the police power regulates its use and
enjoyment, or if it takes or damages it, it is not a taking or damaging for the
public use, but to conserve the safety, morals, health and general welfare of the
public.
116 Wash. at 35-36, 198 P. at 380 (1921).
118. The Court stated:
This is not to say that no differences may exist with respect to government
regulation or rights of citizens arising by virtue of the size and diversity "of
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none of these cases involve a regulation providing for entrance
onto privately owned shopping malls by those who wish to exer-
cise their right to free speech.
The Alderwood court has clearly identified a protectable
public interest in the free exercise of the initiative and petition-
ing process. Moreover, the decline of the publicly owned down-
town shopping area and the recent rise of the privately owned
shopping center have curtailed this interest. The number of
cases illustrating the same clash of interests demonstrates the
need for legislative regulation of access for the purpose of exer-
cising speech rights, particularly of political speech rights. Such
regulation was necessary prior to the decision in Alderwood and
perhaps, because of the variety of opinions in Alderwood, will be
forthcoming.
In conclusion, although the Utter opinion correctly inter-
preted PruneYard as an acknowledgment of the states' author-
ity to grant their citizens broader free speech rights than those
guaranteed by the first amendment, it imprudently concluded
that the Washington Supreme Court was therefore unfettered in
its disposal of the state action requirement in Washington's con-
stitutional free speech provision. Examination of Washington's
constitutional history reveals an incorporation of the public
function analysis as a method of establishing state action in a
claim under article 1, section 5 of the Washington constitution.
Additionally, the reliance on California and New Jersey supreme
court decisions as authority for abandoning the state action
requirement in Washington's constitution failed to reveal sub-
stantive parallels and is therefore unpersuasive. The court could
have relied upon the public function analysis as a basis of estab-
lishing state action in Alderwood and avoided jeopardizing prop-
erty rights in other factual contexts. Instead, it established the
potential of a constitutional conflict every time private property
rights conflict with free speech rights.
Suzanne Lee Elliott
Jane Elizabeth Pearson
activities carried on within a privately owned facility serving the public. There
will be, for example, problems with respect to public health and safety which
vary in degree and in the appropriate government response, depending upon
the size and character of a shopping center, an office building, a sports arena,
or other large facility serving the public for commercial purposes.
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1972).
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